Lwe Reductions

The discrete Gaussian distribution $D_{\mathcal{L}, r}(x)$ is defined over a lattice $\mathcal{L}$ with parameter $r$ such that the probability of sampling a lattice vector $x \in \mathcal{L}$ is proportional to its weight $$ w(x) = e^{-\pi \|x\|^2 / r^2} $$ where $r$ is the Gaussian parameter, ensures that vectors closer to the origin are more likely to be chosen, which is crucial for many lattice-based cryptographic constructions.

Discrete Gauss Distribution

We see that :

  • smaller length of vector $x$ is more likely to be sampled.
  • smaller parameter $r$ means the distribution is more concentrated around the origin, making shorter vectors more likely to be sampled.

Iteration of Discrete Gaussian Sampling

Given :

  1. A lattice $\mathcal{L}(B)$ defined by a basis $B$, and its dual lattice $\mathcal{L}^*(B^{-T})$. They satisfy : $$ \langle x, y \rangle \in \mathbb{Z} \quad \forall x \in \mathcal{L}(B), y \in \mathcal{L}^*(B^{-T}). $$

  2. Discrete Gaussian distribution $D_{\mathcal{L}, r}(x)$ with parameter $r$ over the lattice $\mathcal{L}(B)$, which defines the probability of sampling each lattice vector $x \in \mathcal{L}(B)$ proportional to its weight $$ w(x) = e^{-\pi \|x\|^2 / r^2}. $$ By this distribution, we sample a lattice vector $$ v \leftarrow D_{\mathcal{L}, r}(x) $$

  3. Target $y \in \mathbb{R}^n$, which is sufficiently close to the dual lattice $\mathcal{L}^*(B^{-T})$.

  4. An LWE oracle $\mathcal{O}$.

We aim to find the closest lattice vector $x \in \mathcal{L}^*$ to the target vector $y$, leveraging the discrete Gaussian samples and the LWE oracle $\mathcal{O}$.


Construct LWE Instance

Firstly, We will focus on how to construct a valid LWE instance from the discrete Gaussian samples and the target vector $y$ :

  1. Sample a lattice vector $v$ from the discrete Gaussian distribution over the lattice $\mathcal{L}(B)$ with width parameter $r$: $$ v \leftarrow D_{\mathcal{L}, r}(x) $$

  2. Recover the modularized scalar vector $a = u \pmod q$ from $v$ : $$ a = B^{-1} v \pmod q $$ , it serves as the LWE instance’s public vector component.

  3. Sample a noise $g \in \mathbb{R}$ from the continuous Gaussian distribution with $0$ mean and standard deviation $\frac{\alpha}{2\sqrt{\pi}}$ : $$ g \leftarrow \mathcal{D}(0, \frac{\alpha}{2\sqrt{\pi}}) $$

  4. Compute the LWE response $b$ using the target vector $y$, the discrete Gaussian sample $v$, and the noise $g$: $$ b = \langle y, v \rangle / q + g \pmod 1 $$

    Explanation of the response vector

    Since $y = x + h$ where $x$ is the closest lattice vector to $y$ in $\mathcal{L}^*$ and $h$ is the displacement between $x$ and $y$, we have : $$ \begin{aligned} b &= \langle y, v \rangle / q + g \pmod 1 \\ &= \langle x + h, v \rangle / q + g \pmod 1 \\ &= \langle x, v \rangle / q + \langle h, v \rangle / q + g \pmod 1 \end{aligned} $$ Since $x \in \mathcal{L}^*$ and $v \in \mathcal{L}$, where $x = B^{-T} c, s = c \pmod q$ for some $c \in \mathbb{Z}^n$ and $v = B u, a = u \pmod q$ for some $u \in \mathbb{Z}^n$, we have
    $$ \langle x, v \rangle = \langle B^{-T} c, B u \rangle = \langle c, B^{-1} B u \rangle = \langle c, u \rangle \in \mathbb{Z}. $$ We notice that $c$ and $u$ are the scalar vectors of lattice vectors $x$ and $v$ respectively. And since $$ \langle c, u \rangle \pmod q = \langle s, a \rangle \pmod q $$ , thus $$ \langle c, u \rangle / q \pmod 1 = \langle s, a \rangle / q \pmod 1 $$ Therefore, $$ b = \langle s, a \rangle /q + \boxed{\langle h, v \rangle / q + g} \pmod 1 $$ where $e = \langle h, v \rangle / q + g$ represents the effective noise in the LWE response, it should also comes from a fixed Gaussian distribution which is independent of $v$ we sampled.



The pair $(a, b)$ is an LWE instance with secret $s$ and effective noise $e = \langle h, v \rangle / q + g$, where $a$ is the public vector component and $b$ is the response vector. In order to ensure $(a, b)$ is a valid LWE instance :

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Index

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Index

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A Decade of Lattice Cryptography

Table of Contents

  1. Why do we need worse-case to average-case reductions in lattice-based cryptography?

    Lattice hard problems are believed to be difficult to solve in the worst case. But not every instance of these problems is hard, and some instances may be easy to solve, for example when we use orthogonal basis vectors. In cryptography, we need to ensure almost all instances of the problem are hard, or average-case hard, to guarantee the security of cryptographic schemes. So we rely on worst-case to average-case reductions to construct cryptographic primitives whose security is based on the hardness of worst-case lattice problems.

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Complexity of Lattice Problems

Table of Contents

In complexity theory, we say a problem is hard if it it hard for the worst-case instance; while in cryptography, a problem is deemed hard only if it is hard for the average-case instance (i.e., for all but a negligible fraction of instances).

Basics

Lattice

Definition of a Lattice

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Tensor Product

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Polynomial Ring

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Noetherian and Artinian Rings

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Modules

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Localization

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